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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

FUNDAMENTAL REALITY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY

The problem of the relation of mind and body stands at the entrance to the world of systematic reflection. The transition from the view of the plain man to that of the critical theist is apt to occur at this point. The deeper questions of theistic philosophy all involve this relation, and philosophic discussion is wont to return to it again and again. Two of the most notable books on the subject of recent years are those of Ludwig Busse¹ and C. A. Strong.² They illustrate a difference in philosophical methods characteristic of our time, the former being devoted chiefly to the analysis of metaphysical concepts, while the latter is a criticism of the facts of experience supplemented by a constructive theory of the relation of the body to the mind. Differing thus in method, they differ also in results. Busse, in the end, is a spiritualistic idealist; and although he holds the interaction view that the mind causes bodily processes and the body causes mental processes, still it is not interactionism of the old type—interactionism between brute matter on the one hand, and non-material mind or spirit on the other. Busse views the entire material world as a manifestation of mind. Body and mind are two different spiritual syntheses, and their interaction resembles the contrast and fusion of differing ideas within the same mind. Busse is an idealistic monist.

Strong asserts at last the reality of a plurality of mental (or spiritual) things-in-themselves. As with Busse, so with Strong, the material world is the appearance or phenomenon of spirit, which is real. The two men do not, however, teach the same view of spirit. Strong is a pluralist so far as the theory of the relations of body and mind is concerned. Let us analyze the two books somewhat more closely.

Busse's work is a critical investigation of (1) materialism; (2) the controversy between the view that neural processes and mental processes merely accompany, without influencing, each other, and the view that they interact; and (3) the spiritualistic view according to which mind and body

¹ *Geist und Körper, Leib und Seele.* Von Ludwig Busse. Leipzig: Dürr, 1903. Pp. x+488. M. 8.50.

² *Why has the Mind a Body?* By C. A. Strong. New York: Macmillan, 1903. Pp. vii+355. \$2.50.

are two interacting spiritual syntheses. The author proceeds to analyze these different conceptions of the relation of body to mind, in order to compare them with the facts of experience and the fundamental laws of science.

Three types of materialism, according to Busse, represent the psychical or mental as (1) itself material, (2) as a product of material change, and (3) as a mere aspect or accompaniment of material change.

Against all three the idealistic objection holds that matter is known only through mind, as part of the content of consciousness, and as presupposing consciousness. It is meaningless to say either that mind is matter or that it is a product of material changes, when we are wholly unable to conceive or represent to ourselves in thought a world of matter existing prior to all mind and in absolute independence of it. Such a "matter" is inconceivable and unknown. The only matter we know exists as part of the content of consciousness in such a way that its very existence presupposes consciousness. The argument is perfect from the logical point of view. It fails to convince the plain man, and even the special scientist, because it seems to contradict the immediate deliverances of perception and memory. The author therefore proceeds to criticise the three types of materialism *seriatim*.

1. The view that the mental is itself matter takes three forms. The mental is represented (a) as a sort of stuff, (b) as a condition or state of matter, and (c) as a property of matter. (a) Karl Vogt maintains that the brain secretes thought, impulse, and emotion as the kidneys secrete urine; but this is refuted by specific and fundamental differences between the mental and the physical. The physical has hardness, extension, motion through space, etc., while the mental lacks all these attributes. (b) (c) The other two forms of this type of materialism reduce to the proposition that the mental is a form of motion or a system of motions of material particles; and this proposition the author regards as irrefutable because it is absurd. One may as well say that wood is iron. You can "tongue" the words, but not "brain" them, not think them.

2. The view that the mental, although different from the physical, is yet a product of physical changes, is supported by a very large range of facts. Moreover, the wide abyss between the mental and the physical, while it makes a causal relation between them hard to understand, is not in itself a sufficient reason for denying all causal relation between them. The production of heat, electricity, light, etc., by motion is hard to understand, but it seems to be a fact. Wherever we find invariable sequences in nature, we suspect the presence of causal relations, and between

neural and mental processes invariable sequence certainly obtains. Any such causal relation, however, as could produce the mental *de novo* from the physical would reduce the former to a mere determination of the latter, and this is forbidden by the disparity between them. Finally, it is altogether impossible that the unity of consciousness should arise from the interaction of the parts of the brain.

3. Busse regards parallelistic materialism, the view that the mental is a mere aspect or accompaniment of the physical, as an impossible halting-place between genuine materialism and genuine parallelism (psychophysical parallelism), to the discussion of which he turns.

The discussion of the relative claims of parallelism and interactionism occupies the second and main portion of Busse's book. Both are metaphysical conceptions, and the issue between them is only postponed by the neo-Spinozism that mind and matter are two "aspects" of one and the same reality (the "double-aspect" theory); for the question immediately arises how one and the same reality can be both mental and physical. We are not at liberty to hold that the two are at once identical and different.

Idealistic monism, says Busse, does not teach a genuine parallelism, because in this metaphysic the physical side of the parallelism is less real, less ultimate, than the mental. Hartmann calls it subordination-parallelism. Something to which there is no physical analogue always remains over on the mental side—the *ego*, self, pure spirit. Genuine parallelism is, therefore, not only not a necessary consequence of idealism; it is not consistent with it. Genuine parallelism and thoroughgoing idealism are incompatibles. Interactionism and idealism, Busse holds, go together. (We have already seen that it is not interactionism of the old, naïve sort.) The causal conception of interactionism is a much more natural interpretation of the interdependence which everywhere seems to obtain between mental and bodily processes. There is, moreover, in the principle of causation itself nothing to prevent its application here. Causation only means a thoroughgoing unity and interrelatedness of all that is actual; while parallelism divides the actual into two worlds with no interrelations, and tries to explain the wonder of their uniform correspondence by the still greater wonder of their hidden identity.

Moreover, parallelism does not accord with the facts of experience. There is no physical analogue for the relating consciousness and its syntheses. There is no physical analogue for the unity of consciousness as a whole. Parallelism presupposes two closed systems of change, a physical and a mental (closed in the sense that neither influences the other), and on the physical side this presupposition is not borne out by the facts. This

presupposition means that all organisms are automata, and the automaton view of plants and animals has been abandoned as untenable. Among psychic organisms, parallelism means a pluralistic doctrine of the soul; and here the author criticises some modern forms of psychological pluralism.

For interactionism Busse claims that it is the natural way of construing the relation of the mental to the physical; that it answers better than parallelism the logical need of the mind to conceive the world as a whole; that it avoids the paradoxical and absurd consequences of parallelism; that it tallies with the nature of mental processes; and that it harmonizes better than parallelism with idealistic views of the world.

The final chapter of this book outlines an idealistic theory of interaction. What Busse has said of idealistic parallelism may, however, be said of his own idealistic interactionism. It is interactionism "with a modification." We are no longer dealing with the old relation of a mind and a body which are essentially different from each other, but with a relation between one mental synthesis and another. Busse seems to assume that monistic idealism is true, and spends himself to show that interactionism is more consistent with this metaphysic than parallelism. For this reason, the concluding chapter of this book is not convincing. What if one be neither a materialist, an idealist, nor a dualist? What if one hold that both body and mind are abstractions from the content of experience where alone they have significance? It means nothing, to such a thinker, to ask after the interrelations of abstractions apart from the content of experience; while the question of their relation to each other in experience is a question of facts and their meanings—a question to be settled by an analysis of experience and a history of these particular abstract conceptions.

With respect to method Strong's work is less at fault. He does not set up two questionable metaphysical entities and try by analysis to decide which is real and which is phenomenal. He leaves open the view that both are real as syntheses within experience, although he inclines at last to say that the material synthesis (the body) is a function of the mental, that the body is an appearance of a thing-in-itself which is at bottom identical with consciousness. Consciousness is real, and the brain-process is its phenomenon, its perception. Not that the individual consciousness precipitates or projects its own brain and material world. Far from it. In reality there are many consciousnesses (or things-in-themselves), and the body with the entire physical world is an ideal construction resulting from the interaction and intercourse of minds. Contact and intercourse of mind with mind gives rise to the perception of a material world. The

real causal relation, however, does not lie between the mind and its brain, but between my mind and minds lying outside of my mind, between my mind and extra-mental things-in-themselves. As a product of that causal relation there arises in my mind a material world in which bodies and brains are parts. This material world remains, however, to the end a phenomenon or appearance. It is not real or ultimate as the mind is real and ultimate.

Before commenting on Strong's conclusions, let us look more closely into the method of his book. "The problem of the relation of mind and body takes, for contemporary thought, the form of the issue between interactionism and automatism," the latter term including both the materialism and the parallelism of Busse's discussion. Interactionism, automatism, and parallelism are all "causal" theories; the first holding that each produces changes in the other; the second, that the body produces changes in the mind, but not *vice versa*; and the third, that neither influences the other. Strong's book is a discussion of these three views. The book is divided into two parts, of which the first is empirical and the second metaphysical. Each part is divided into two books. Book I deals with "The Facts;" Book II, with "The Question of Causal Relations;" Book III, with "Metaphysical Principles;" Book IV is an "Application of the Foregoing Principles to the Problem"—a criticism of the causal theories. In Book I, after a "general survey" of the known facts about the relations of mind and body, the author discusses the question as to "the immediate correlate of consciousness," and concludes that it is the brain. In a third chapter in this first book we take up the "extent of the correlation on the mental side," and find "that consciousness as a whole never occurs except in connection with a brain-process," and "that particular mental states never occur except in connection with particular brain-events" (p. 66). In Book II "the question of causal relations" is discussed by stating and criticising the three causal theories mentioned above. We may quote Strong's conclusion:

The result of our study of the empirical arguments is that they seem insufficient to justify a decision. Several of them have been shown to be fallacious. Of the sound ones, the causal argument proves the parallelist thesis, but its validity is hypothetical, resting on the assumption that mental events are simultaneous with their cerebral correlates. [Whether they are simultaneous or successive the author regards as an unsettled question, one which probably cannot be settled by experiment.] We may therefore dismiss it from consideration. The argument from the principles of biology appears to prove the mind efficient; but it is subject to the difficulty regarding the origin of consciousness. The argument from the principle of the conservation of energy raises a strong pre-

sumption, not amounting to demonstrative proof, that the contrary is the case. Thus two great branches of natural science seem arrayed against each other. Physics and biology appear to authorize opposite conclusions concerning the efficiency of mind. And it does not appear who is to be the arbiter between them. (Pp. 159 f.)

It may be well to remark just here that, according to Busse, the law of conservation is not a sufficient refutation of interactionism. This law means (1) the quantitative equivalence of cause and effect, and (2) the quantitative constancy of the material universe as a whole. The former rests upon experimental investigation; the latter is an undemonstrable postulate of the physical sciences. The former is in no way inconsistent with the doctrine of interactionism; and to use the latter to disprove the efficiency of mind is to reason in a circle.

In Book III, the first book of the second part of his work, the author takes up the metaphysical principles involved in this whole discussion, and first of all the physical world. In treating the relations of mind and body, most writers "spend their time in discussing the relation of two things of whose nature they have no clear conception." To avoid this mistake, we now inquire: "(1) whether the objects we see and touch exist independently of our minds, or only as modifications of our minds; (2) assuming the latter to be the case, whether these modifications stand for real existences external to our minds" (p. 165). As to the first question there is no possibility of doubt. That *esse* is *percipi*, all agree. "This, I think, is a doctrine all but universally accepted by philosophers." This is the critical feature of Berkeley's philosophy—"material objects exist as modifications of the mind" (p. 166)—and here we stand together. The parting of the ways begins with the question "whether the mental states of which alone we are immediately conscious stand for realities outside the mind." Such realities, the author calls "things-in-themselves."

We first take up naïve realism, the doctrine that the mind immediately knows objects which exist independently. The argument of physiology, that between the object and our consciousness of it a series of physical and physiological events intervene as the necessary condition of our being aware of the object (in the case of vision, for example, light-waves, retinal excitation, nerve impulse along the optic nerves and tracts, cortical excitation in the occipital lobe of the brain)—this argument is valid. The object in itself cannot be the same as the consciousness of it. The latter is a resultant of this series of physical and physiological events. Neither can our consciousness of the object be an immediate knowledge of it. On the other hand, this physiological argument seems to indicate a difference

between two groups of attributes in the object—a group which the object as it is in itself possesses, and a group which it possesses only by virtue of the action of the former upon the sense-organs and brain; in other words, primary and secondary qualities (p. 175). The ordinary scientific view of the world is built on this distinction. The world of physics is a world of impenetrable, extended, measurable objects possessing the power of motion only. Color, sound, odor, etc., are effects produced in us by this world of hard and moving things.

Naïve realism is untenable, and the author proceeds to show that this scientific realism is nothing but naïve realism in another form. The “object” of scientific realism lies just as far beyond our powers of touch and sight as the “object” of naïve realism. Our knowledge of the object is in both cases purely representative, not presentative or immediate. The hardness, extension, and motion of the “object” are dependent upon the same sort of physical contacts and physiological processes as color and sound. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a distinction *within* the realm of sensation and consciousness—not a distinction between that realm and a world which transcends it. “Our world consists of nothing but actual and possible perceptions; that is, it contains nothing essentially non-phenomenal” (p. 182). We are cut off from the extra-bodily object by the whole intervening chain of causes and effects, and the necessary result is that we cannot know that object immediately, but only our subjective image of it.

Here the metaphysician steps in and observes that we have no evidence derived from immediate experience that extra-mental objects exist.

Suppose everything outside the mind to be annihilated, but our perceptions to succeed each other exactly as before. We should never suspect the disappearance of things extra-mental, and should have as much reason to assume their existence as we have at present. Now, suppose extra-mental things to continue, but no perceptions of them to arise in our minds. They would be for us as good as non-existent. These corollaries do not, of course, disprove the existence of an extra-mental world; but I think they bring forcibly home to us how true it is that *our* world is the world of our perceptions. (P. 186.)

It was just at this point that Berkeley assumed the existence of a divine Mind to account for the succession of perceptions in our minds. For Berkeley there exists no external world outside the mind, but the divine Mind so orders our perceptions that we seem to see an external world which is independent of our perception of it. When the plain man asks what becomes of the setting sun, the North Pole, the other side of the moon, the objects behind my back, etc., when I am not looking at them

or thinking about them, Berkeley answers that they exist as possibilities of perception in the thought and purpose of God. Thus two interpretations of the external world of naïve realism are before us. The extra-mental realities of scientific realism seem necessary to science, although they are metaphysically indefensible. The extra-mental divine Mind of Berkeley answers every demand of experience, and offers us another and a different interpretation of the same facts.

But, although the very objects we perceive cannot continue to exist when we no longer perceive them, it is consistent with idealism that they should have extra-mental causes which continue to exist, and of which the perceived objects are symbolic (p. 191).

At this point Strong takes up the nature of consciousness, the other term in the relation of body to mind. He discusses the view that consciousness is merely a manifold of mental states, and also the view that beneath or behind consciousness there is a soul or transcendental ego. The former view is refuted by the arguments for the latter. There is a felt need of an ego. As there cannot be motion without an object to move, so there cannot be thought without a thinker. And, again, the manifold of mental states is so mutable and transitory that we cannot conceive it except as supported by some more durable, underlying being. Our choice lies between making it dependent on the brain and on the soul. The latter view is, however, at fault in asserting the existence of a spiritual principle which transcends experience. The ego which transcends experience is really the ego of immediate experience, the actual ego which is immediately known and cannot be adequately represented. The ego is not a thing. In no ordinary sense is it an agent. It is rather knowledge and experience in their immediacy.

If we reject both the above theories, the stream of consciousness with its empirical characters enters on the reality now vacated by the Soul or Subject. In this reality every thought and feeling shares.

Thus, having reduced matter to our perceptions and the mind to the stream of immediate experiences, we seem headed straight for a doctrine of universal phenomenalism. We have, however, left open the question of the existence of things-in-themselves, and universal phenomenalism is untenable because it

makes no provision for knowledge of the minds of other men and animals. They do not exist in its world. So serious is this omission that phenomenalism cannot be adjusted to it without admitting extra-mental realities in principle, and so ceasing to be thoroughgoing (p. 215).

The existence of other minds is not immediately known. It is an

inference, but an inference as to the truth of which it is impossible for us to entertain doubt. If we try to prove it, all proof breaks down.

It is in the nature of the case impossible that consciousness should supply rational grounds for the inference of realities beyond itself. We can only find ourselves as a matter of fact inferring such realities, and continue to infer them in the absence of positive reasons to the contrary. Now, it is surely a striking fact, and one whose importance for epistemology can hardly be overestimated, that something to which neither the external nor the internal senses lend the slightest testimony may yet be with perfect certainty known to exist.

Philosophers have always assumed that knowledge must rest either on reason or on experience, and

it never occurred to them that we might have a kind of knowledge less rational than either, a kind founded neither on reason nor experience, but solely on instinct. It never occurred to them that neither experience nor reason can fully account for the knowledge of other minds.

In the present writer's opinion, here is the *crux* of Strong's argument, but—a word later on.

Strong takes "our indisputable knowledge of other minds" to be the refutation of "the current dogma about the unknowability and consequent irrationality of non-empirical existences." Other minds are things-in-themselves whose existence is established by neither reason nor experience. Perception and memory, and hence all knowledge, involve the existence of other minds, of a reality which transcends my consciousness. This reality is no sort of possible experience for me; it is actual experience for other minds than my own. The discussion proceeds to refute the Kantian arguments against things-in-themselves, and then advances to the proofs for the existence of things-in-themselves. The last chapter in the third book of the work discusses the nature of things-in-themselves, and concludes that "since consciousness is the only reality of which we have immediate knowledge," "we have no other conception of reality." We must regard things-in-themselves, therefore, as mental in their nature. "This is the more necessary, that individual minds arise out of them by evolution" (p. 295).

Following this discussion comes Book IV, in which an application of these metaphysical principles to the main problem is made. Strong is an interactionist, but he does not teach the interaction of mind and body. The primary interaction is between these mental things-in-themselves, out of which, in the process of evolution, minds develop. The interaction of things-in-themselves takes the form of competitive struggle and rivalry (as the author maintains in an article³ published about a year later than

³ *Archives de psychologie*, November, 1904.

the book we are discussing). Those things-in-themselves which vary in the direction of a consciousness of an external world, having an advantage over their fellows, survive; and so the consciousness of an external world gradually evolves.

This work is so well conceived and written that one is borne on to the end without consciousness of difficulty. Then one awakes and rubs his eyes. One is so thoroughly convinced by all the first part, and by chaps. 8 and 9 of Book III in the second part, that the final outcome of the discussion is a surprise. For the possibility of extra-mental things-in-themselves seemed to be refuted by the earlier argument, while here at the close they have become the explanatory principle in the body-mind relationship. The argument moves steadily and swiftly in the direction of what the author calls "thoroughgoing phenomenism." Matter is reduced to perception, and mind to a stream of mental states. But thoroughgoing phenomenism makes no provision for the existence of other minds than my own! We know by instinct (not by reason or experience) that other minds exist. We are more certain of them than of the external world. Indeed, given other minds as naked things-in-themselves, the world of matter can be accounted for as a pure phenomenon. We should be phenomenalists as to matter, but not as to mind. Let us look more closely at a few points in this argument.

i. By "thoroughgoing phenomenism" we here understand a solipsistic subjectivism, the skeptical doctrine that nothing can be known to exist but the immediate content of my own consciousness. It reduces everything to terms of content in my own consciousness, and hence makes no provision for the existence of other minds than my own. But is this the necessary outcome of the author's reduction of matter to terms of perception, and of mind to mental states? Has the argument shown that matter and mind have no existence except as elements in the immediate content of my present moment of consciousness? On the contrary, it has shown that my ego, the individuality of my mind, and the limits of my consciousness exist only as I think them. He has not shown that everything exists in me, so much as that I, along with everything else, am a determination within a continuum of pure experience. If mind is reducible to mental states along with the external world, what can it mean to say that my mind excludes all others in such a way as to make the inference that they exist impossible? My separate individuality is one mental synthesis within a stream of mental syntheses: it is simply one among many mental states. To put this criticism in other words, the author's demonstration that whatever exists exists *for* conscious-

ness is not new, and it is certainly true; but to assume that this is equivalent to the position that whatever exists exists only *in* my private consciousness is gratuitous. The thoroughgoing phenomenalist cannot accept the limitation of his own private consciousness as real without ceasing to be thoroughgoing. This is saying that everything is reducible to terms of mental content except the reduction process, which is real and excludes other similar reduction processes going on at other centers of consciousness. Lurking behind the author's "thoroughgoing phenomenism" is a metaphysical assumption that perception and mental states are always somebody's, and that this somebody is no phenomenon, but a reality; and this is just what the author's argument seems to refute.

If we strip the argument of this assumption, we may then recognize the fact of experience that the whole distinction between mine and thine is a development within experience. Experience is a broader term than my-consciousness, and more ultimate. No doubt experience is here a metaphysical real. The conception of pure or immediate experience which figures so largely in the philosophy of Wundt and in the logical discussions of recent years has many of the traits of a metaphysical postulate.⁴ I do not see how we are to think at all without some reality, even if it be nothing more than the fact of change itself, the flux of Heraclitus.

Once more, the knowledge that I am a mind or have a mind presupposes a knowledge that there are other minds. And this is no mere logical quibble. Psychologically speaking, the consciousness of self is a consciousness of ego-alter relationships. The concept of a pure ego is a metaphysical abstraction. In point of fact, I am not first conscious of my own mind, and then by inference or otherwise conscious that you too have a mind. In both the child and the race intelligence develops by discovering similarities and differences among the things entering into experience, and the differences which count are always differences of behavior.⁵ Persons are thus distinguished from impersonal things, and by assimilation processes we put ourselves into the class called persons or selves. In all this there is never a time when my mind excludes without, from other points of view, including other minds.

Consequently the author's statement that we know "by instinct" (not by reason or experience) that other minds exist appears to be an attempt to readjust with a word a difficulty which he has himself unconsciously

⁴ See John Dewey, "The Postulate of Pure Experience," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II, No. 15, July 20, 1905.

⁵ Baldwin, *Origin of Thing and Its Nature* (Princeton Contributions to Psychology).

created. Suppose a man walking along the shore of a large body of water were to ask himself how he came by his knowledge that the body of water has another shore. The other shore is no mere possibility of future experience to him, but an actuality which excludes his present actual experience. It is also an actuality which his present actual experience in a sense includes. He need not resort to instinct to find a basis for his belief that the other shore is real. Instinct is a tendency to act, and all knowledge presupposes and rests upon congenital motor tendencies of this sort. Surely the author cannot mean that the knowledge of the existence of other minds is innate.

2. Another difficulty presented by the latter part of this work is the very problem which the author is here trying to solve, namely, the genesis of matter from mind, assuming a manifold of mental things-in-themselves to be real. We are dealing with the evolution of a material world, or (what amounts to the same thing) with the evolution of the perception of a material world. This is not synonymous with the evolution of the illusion of a material world; because the illusion of a material world which did not exist would be a hindrance rather than an advantage in the struggle for existence. There must *be* a material world, if perception is to have any functional significance or constitute fitness for survival.

Nor do I see how there could be a consciousness of itself in a mental thing-in-itself without a consciousness of a not-self. In assuming a consciousness of self in these metaphysical minds, is not the author really assuming all that he seems to derive? In other words, is not the author's thesis that the material is the phenomenon of mental things-in-themselves really a mere restatement of Berkeley's problem under the rubrics of the Darwinian biology? After a masterly review of facts familiar to every psychologist, and a lucid statement and discussion of existing theories of causal dependence between mind and body, he takes up the metaphysical problem, and once more rearranges the facts so as to give concreteness and definiteness to a new formulation of the idealist's problem, for the solution of which we must look to further works from the author's pen.

Finally, we note the tendency of both of these works to make the spiritual primary in the world in which body and mind must both be considered factors. In this respect these books are characteristic of the time. Psychology and philosophy are turning away from the materialistic view which held a place of fundamental importance in the discussions of a quarter of a century ago. Differing in method and results, Busse and Strong agree in this, that the mental life is real, and that the material world of mechanical categories is its phenomenon. Just how it is so they

have not told us. From many points of view, the most significant result of their investigations is their idealism; and one can say this even while frankly confessing that their results are not in all respects satisfying.

Perhaps a more careful criticism of the facts and metaphysical conceptions involved in this question may lead to a doctrine which is neither materialism nor idealism. Perhaps the time has come when we should abandon the impossible task of either reducing mind to terms of matter or matter to terms of mind. Perhaps mind in the sense of a private world, a closed universe with no open windows and no fresh breezes, is a metaphysical fiction, just as matter was long since found to be. May it not be that the principle of abstract individuality has been, in our efforts to maintain the separate existence, freedom, and responsibility of the soul, carried to the extent of logical anarchy and nihilism? The more the present writer reflects upon this problem, the more he feels that both mind and matter are necessary factors in an experience which comprehends both. The doctrine of this experience may be called realism or radical empiricism; but we may be sure the practical and the moral will be vindicated by it.

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THE FINALITY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

Professor Foster tells us, with exemplary modesty, that he has no new message to bring through this book;¹ that, in fact, all that is contained in it has been told by others. This may be true. It would be true in some sense of any serious book that might be published today. And yet Professor Foster's work has succeeded in commanding the attention of a very large section, if not of the whole, of the theological world in the English-speaking countries as no other of its class published in the last decade has done. The question which naturally and inevitably presents itself is: How has this result been achieved? What are the distinctive peculiarities of a book which has awakened into life the dormant energies of the science of theology, so long supposed to be bereft of vitality? As far as form is concerned, the work does not offer much that will explain its success. It begins with an introductory section of fifty pages, comprising a general "Introduction" and a "Historical Survey," and is from that point onward divided into two parts; i. e., Part I, "Authority-Religion (Super-

¹ *The Finality of the Christian Religion.* By George Burman Foster. [The Decennial Publications, Second Series, Vol. XVI.] Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1906. xv+518 pages. \$4.